CQ WEEKLY
Oct. 26, 2008 – 12:26 p.m.
Futurist: One Click, One Vote
By Mark Stencel, CQ Columnist
The lines for early voting have been long in North Carolina, one of this year’s unexpected electoral battlegrounds. State officials reported late last week that more than 800,000 people had already cast their ballots.
Among those voters were hundreds of Wake County residents, including my father, who waited for an hour to cast their ballots a couple of weekends ago at the Cary Town Center shopping mall, a short drive from the state capital in Raleigh. That must have been a galling experience for those busy suburbanites, many of whom work for the “Research Triangle” area’s numerous technology firms. In an age of instant online access to so many public and private services — including all of the Web-based storefronts of the same retailers that have shops in the Cary mall — how is it that people were still standing in long, winding lines to vote? Aren’t lines just for roller coaster riders and airline passengers?
So why not vote on the Web? Internet voting is not a new idea, but it is a long way from reality — at least in the United States. Pilot projects during the past decade in this country have focused almost entirely on voters who live and work overseas, particularly people in the military. For these voters, the realities of international postage delivery are often at odds with state and local deadlines and processes for requesting and returning absentee ballots, so e-ballots make sense.
Electionline, a Pew Center on the States project that tracks voting trends, notes that seven states now permit military and oversees voters to use e-mail to send in absentee ballots — the Internet-age equivalent of faxing in the documents. And a few state political parties, including the Democratic organizations in Michigan and Arizona, have dabbled in online voting as part of their presidential nominating caucuses. But real-time voting via the Web just has not taken off here.
The technological concerns about Internet ballots are the same that some voters have with electronic voting machines: accountability, security, privacy and redundancy. But the highly federated systems of administering elections in this country, and of keeping tabs on the population, are major obstacles to online voting as well.
Voting experiments in other countries help underscore the distinctive challenges for American election officials. Take Estonia, the small, young Baltic democracy that has been a global innovator in e-government services. In 2005, the former Soviet republic allowed nationwide Internet voting in its local council elections. More than 9,000 voters, including the prime minister, used the service. But most of the country’s 1 million registered voters were eligible, as long as they possessed a new national ID card and had access to a device that allowed a computer to read the card’s embedded electronics. In combination with a private, government-issued PIN, this system made voting via a secure Web connection as easy as a transaction at a bank teller machine. And in parliamentary elections last year, three times as many Estonians cast their votes online.
A Hodgepodge of Requirements
Compare all that with a new online voting experiment in Arizona. Also a pioneer in online government, that state was the first of only two that allow voter registration on the Web. Since the United States has no national ID card, Arizona’s system depends on driver’s licenses or official state identification. Easy enough. And, in fact, this successful system served as the entry point for about 60 percent of the people who joined the voter rolls this year before Arizona’s Oct. 6 registration deadline.
Now the state is taking the next logical step: Internet balloting for overseas voters. But this system is not quite as simple. First, voters need to obtain log-in information and passwords from their home counties. After that, they can download ballots, as well as affidavits that require their signatures. The completed documents can then be scanned and uploaded to the state via a secure Internet connection. The state transmits the files to the counties, which validate the signatures and registration information before sending the ballots along to be tabulated by local vote counters. Got it?
A news release by Secretary of State Jan Brewer’s office notes that Arizona’s Internet voting system is based on “the same type of security used for online banking and credit card transactions.” However, if online banking were in fact done this way, customers would write out checks, scan them into a computer and then upload the images of those check to their bank, which would then make disbursements from a local branch office.
Arizona’s online voting system carefully and cleverly preserves its counties’ official role in administering key parts of the election process. But it also illustrates the challenge Brewer and other officials face in creating simple Internet voting processes that comply with this country’s hodgepodge of state and local election requirements.
Inevitably, online voting will become a trusted way of exercising democracy’s most fundamental rights. But, in part because of the quirks that distinguish American democracy and culture, the United States is unlikely to lead the way.
Mark Stencel is editor and deputy publisher of Congressional Quarterly Inc.’s Governing magazine and its Web site, Governing.com. For a complete listing of his column, click here.




Comments
Why Vote?
The article asks, "why not vote on the Web?" One answer is, because security experts have found that voting on the web creates serious security vulnerabilities. See the analysis: http://www.servesecurityreport.org/
If your Dad didn't want to wait in line at early voting, he could vote on election day where lines are much shorter. Or he could call the county BoE and find out which early voting site is less busy. Many sites in Wake County had a 15 minute waiting period. There is no way to make internet voting secure, and the results would be dubvious. We have a secret ballot which cannot be traced to us, and this is a huge difference from banking. And the financial incentive to rig an internet election is huge because you could change all of the votes.
I truly appreciate the concerns about security, which were in fact mentioned in the column, as well as Laura Roslin's comments about the secret ballot. The question I was interested in is how is it that Estonia has figured out how to address these very same concerns, and what is it about the way the United States administers elections that makes that harder to do here. The answer turns out to a historic and much-debated aversion to the idea of national IDs in the U.S. and a highly decentralized system of state and local election administration.
But aren't there two levels of security concern? a) Validating that the voter is who he or she is supposed to be and b) ensuring that the technical infrastructure is fortified and secure? How would the Estonian e-voting gone down if had happened during the Russian cyber attack in May of '07? (http://tinyurl.com/5pmk5g) Assuming we kept something along the lines of single voting day and didn't open it up to a voting month (or whatever), couldn't a denial of service attack plus a strict reading of/adherence to voting laws ("deadlines are deadlines") lead to as much or more trouble than single voter ID fraud?
There are all kinds of vulnerabilities, absolutely, a denial of service attack or some kind of other cyber assault among them, as Michael notes above. But our current offline systems for managing elections also are vulnerable to all manner of disruption, from weather to worse. The 9/11 attacks happened to be primary day for New York City's 2001 municipal elections; voting was postponed, needless to say (ttp://tinyurl.com/5bcfwz). I don't point this out as an argument for or against Internet voting. But the tendency to see vulnerabilities in electronic voting systems (whether online or systems at the physical polling place) as significantly different from non-electronic systems (missing paper ballots or manual manipulation of registration rolls) is interesting. Any process involving humans is vulnerable, and I am not convinced that current practices are especially efficient, reliable or secure. My wife and I waited 70 minutes to cast absentee ballots in Fairfax County, Virginia, last night. The main hold up: Election workers had to read each paper absentee voter application and call someone on the phone to verify details. Much of the time we were there, the six available voting machines were idle.
ever hear of a secret ballot?
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